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TUNA RESOURCE MANAGEMENT
Troubled fishing in Pacific waters
Ron Duncan
The Pacific island countries persist with
tuna fishing policies that are significantly
inferior to what appear to be the
economically and environmentally sensible
courses to follow. Economists have been
offering advice over a fairly long period about
better policy options without having any
discernable favourable impact. This lack of
success might be due, as Gordon Tullock once
said, to the fact that economists tend to flit
from one area to another in demonstrating
problems with government policies. Tullock
suggested that economists, whose primary
task is to prod governments towards better
policies, could have better success if
individual economists focused on one issue
and continually endeavoured to educate the
public and the government about the
problems with that particular socially
inferior intervention.
It is in that spirit that I discuss again
problems that I and others see in the tuna
fishing policies of the Pacific island
countries. I also examine some of the costs of
existing policies and reasons for these
governments failing to follow what appear
to be policies that will maximise the benefits
from the exploitation of this resource in an
environmentally sustainable manner.
Pacific tuna and resource rents
The importance of tuna to the economies of
the Pacific has been discussed, so I will not
repeat those observations here. However, it
is worthwhile noting that the economic
contribution of the resource could be greater
if different policies were followed. The
migratory nature of the tuna stock and its
implications for the availability of fish both
inside and beyond the exclusive economic
zones of the Pacific island countries should
also be familiar. The sustainability of the
different species of tuna is a matter in which
I have no expertise and therefore do not
discuss, although good information about
stock size and sustainability of harvest rates
is critical to the setting of good policy for the
management of the resource. I note, however,
that the sustainability of some tuna species
is subject to dispute (Hampton et al. 2005;
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Myers and Worm 2005). Therefore, I trust that
cautions about the sustainability of tuna
harvests are better predictions than some of
the claims that have been made about the
sustainability of logging in the Solomon
Islands.1
Accurate information about the returns
to the Pacific island countries from the
exploitation of the tuna stock is difficult to
obtain, in large part because the deals made
over access by fishers lack transparency.
Besides the reluctance to divulge information
about the direct monetary payments for
access, there are various kinds of package
deals involving items such as the building
of port and processing infrastructure and
employment of local labour. Petersen (2006)
records the extent of disagreement over the
level of access fees paid by the distant-water
fishing nations (DWFNs). Of interest is that,
on average, the access fees appear to have
declined (from an average of 4 or 5 per cent
of gross revenue in the 1980s to around 3 per
cent recently) and the level of access fees is
much lower than reported for other fishing
regions. I look at these two issues below.
The basic principle in the exploitation of
natural resources is to maximise the
‘economic rent’, that is, in the case of fisheries,
the difference between the value of the catch
and the economic cost of the fishing effort.
Various attempts have been made to calculate
the optimal resource rent from the Pacific tuna
fishery. The problem with these exercises,
however, is that the true economic cost of the
fishing effort will be revealed only by
subjecting fishing firms to competition. This
means that rights to fish should be auctioned
to force fishers to bid against each other and
thereby reveal the true cost of fishing.
The only options for pricing fishing
rights that Pacific island countries appear
willing to consider are multilateral and
bilateral negotiations. Those favouring
multilateral agreements appear to believe
that the Pacific island countries have some
monopoly power. But as Duncan et al. (1999)
argue, competition from other fisheries and
from substitute foods makes this unlikely.
Bilateral negotiations appear to be favoured
by the Pacific island countries, but as various
writers note, DWFNs ‘game’ the individual
Pacific countries into what appear to be
concessionary deals. As Duncan and Temu
(1997) argue, once economically sustainable
country quotas are allocated on a multilateral
basis, individual countries can auction off
their quotas among all the fishers. If the
tendering process does not appear to be
competitive, then the tender should be
readvertised. The number of fishing nations
and fishing firms is now sufficiently numerous
to ensure a competitive bidding process. The
quotas should be multi-year and should be
transferable between fishers. By creating an
asset in the form of a right to fish, among other
things, monitoring costs will be reduced as
fishers will attempt to protect their asset by
reporting any illegal fishing. Chand et al.
(2003) have spelt out the principles of an
economically sensible mechanism for
allocating fishing access in the Pacific fishery.
It was also suggested in Duncan and
Temu (1997; see also Duncan 2004) that the
tendering process could be used to provide a
stable flow of resource rents to the Pacific
island countries, in recognition of the volatile
nature of fish catches and fish prices. Fishers
are much better positioned to assess these
risks and to hedge against them than are the
small Pacific countries. Parris and Grafton
(2005:164) suggest that the less than 50 per
cent of ‘economic rent’2 that the Pacific island
countries are receiving can be justified by the
high risk of tuna fishing. Again, I have to say
that under existing arrangements, Pacific
island countries have no idea of the true
economic rent and no idea of the fishers’
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Poor policies and their costs
As Duncan and Temu (1997) noted, there are
two major problems with the tuna fisheries
policies adopted by the Pacific island
countries. First, the policies do not follow the
economic principle of comparative
advantage and attempt to promote economic
activities that do not make the best use of
these countries’ factor endowments. Second,
the policies adopted ignore what is known
as the Tinbergen Principle, that is, the very
useful principle of economic policymaking
that argues that there should be only one
policy instrument for each policy objective
(Tinbergen 1952). In many cases, countries
are trying to achieve more than one economic
objective with one policy instrument. I shall
illustrate how these principles are violated
as I discuss the various policies being
followed.
The objective of allowing the
exploitation of the tuna fishing resource
should be to maximise the Pacific island
countries’ share of the resource rent over time.
This would be best done by setting up a
system of tradable permits and allocating
these competitively among fishers through
auction or by tender. Under this system,
fishing rights would be allocated to the most
efficient fishers and would maximise the
share of resource rents to the Pacific island
countries, as the most efficient fishers would
be able to bid the highest access price for the
permit.
There should be no discrimination in
favour of national fleets for several reasons.
First, it is most unlikely that tuna fishing with
capital-intensive vessels (such as purse
seiners) and equipment is in conformity with
their comparative advantage, as the Pacific
island countries generally are not capital rich
and therefore do not have a comparative
advantage in capital-intensive activities.
Second, vessels and equipment used by
national fishers are generally not the most
up-to-date and therefore not likely to be the
most efficient, so the access fee loss from
discriminating in their favour will be
magnified by the higher cost of fishing.
Third, tuna fishing on a large scale, such as
through the use of purse seiners, is also high
risk, as noted above, and subsidising small
developing countries to enter such a risky
and competitive business is not likely to be
in their best interest. The problems are
magnified if the government is taking part in
the enterprise, whether as a joint-venture
partner or as a sole proprietor, as the country
usually ends up wearing the loss in the event
of the collapse of the venture.
The bundling of cheap access to fishers
with promises of investment in the country
has been a favourite policy of the Pacific
island countries, however, it violates the
Tinbergen principle of one policy, one
instrument. Pacific island countries are
rightly concerned about increasing
investment and jobs in order to promote
economic growth. By bundling investment
and employment promotion together with
providing access to tuna fisheries, however,
none of the objectives are likely to be achieved
efficiently.3 Moreover, the country will not
know what it has forgone in trying to achieve
these goals. Each of the objectives should be
pursued independently using first-best
policies. The resource rents should be
maximised using a single policy, as should
investment and employment promotion.
Another form of ‘bundling’ of policies in
Pacific fishing is the provision of cheap
access in return for aid. Petersen (2006) has
provided a good account of such poor
policies with respect to Japanese aid. An
important adverse side-effect of these poor
policies and their associated opaqueness,
which allows huge room for discretionary
behaviour on the part of politicians and civil
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fact, because first-best policies would reduce
the scope for discretionary behaviour and
corruption, this is one of the most likely
reasons why their adoption is resisted. For
this reason, it is very important that the costs
of poor policies are continually brought to
public attention.
Forcing DWFNs to service their ships at
Pacific island country ports, where the costs
of fuel, parts and labour are likely to be
higher than in their home ports or in the ports
of larger countries, is in effect purchasing
local investment and employment at the cost
of reduced resource rents, as forcing fishers
to use these services raises their costs and
reduces the resource rent they will be willing
to pay. Moreover, provision of such port
services might not be in conformity with the
Pacific island countries’ comparative
advantage. Similarly, fish processing may
also not be serving the country’s comparative
advantage. Just because a country is rich in
a natural resource, such as fish, it does not
follow that it has a comparative advantage
in processing the resource. Moreover,
processing the fish is only part of the
requirements for successfully engaging in
fish processing. As has been shown from the
experience of Soltai Fishing and Processing
(formerly Solomon Taiyo Ltd) in Solomon
Islands, when the government took over the
fishing company previously operated in
partnership with a Japanese company,
access to the network and marketing
expertise of the Japanese partner was lost
(Barclay 2005).
Forcing local processing facilities to use
domestic fishers, exempting domestic fishers
or locally based DWFN fishers from access
fees, and levying export taxes on unprocessed
fish to subsidise local processing are also
inferior policies on several counts. Where is
the analysis that points to forgone resource
rents being used to promote domestic fishing
fleets or domestic processors as being the best
use of these rents? Why should domestic
canneries be placed at a disadvantage in an
internationally competitive industry by
being forced to take fish from a domestic
industry that needs subsidies to survive?
Moreover, why should overfishing of the
tuna stock be encouraged by subsidising
fishing and canning through EU preferential
entry and rules of origin?4
The 1993 ban on the trans-shipment of
tuna at sea and the requirement for DWFN
fishers to transfer their catch in Pacific island
country ports was imposed in the highly
questionable belief that this would generate
additional benefits to the Pacific island
countries. Requiring fishing vessels to steam
to Pacific island country ports to unload their
catch adds to their costs in terms of fuel, lost
time in fishing and lost time in unloading in
inefficient ports. These costs are ultimately
not borne by the fishers but reduce the access
fees that they are willing to pay. Other
mandatory requirements on DWFN fishers,
such as visits to Pacific island country ports
for inspections and to purchase a minimum
value of supplies while in port, have the same
consequences. The points system developed
by the Forum Fisheries Agency for evaluating
vessels applying for regional fishing access,
with its emphasis on local equity, numbers
of nationals employed, value of local
purchases and value of onshore investment,
promotes all the worst features of fishing
policies in the Pacific.
The cost to the Pacific island countries
of the policies they have adopted is very
difficult to evaluate. It could be estimated
only if a market-based access allocation
scheme were followed that established the
true economic rent. If the market-based
resource rent were known, there would be
some chance of estimating the return on the
access fees given up in exchange for the
promotion of local investment and
employment. The cost of these policies,
however, does appear to be showing up in
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As noted earlier, the ban on trans-shipment
and other mandatory requirements placed
on DWFN fishers, such as compulsory port
inspections, add to the costs of fishing and
reduce the resource rent. Exemptions from
access fees for domestic fishers and part or
whole exemption for locally based DWFN
fishers also reduce the access fees.
The Pacific 2020 report (AusAID 2006:50)
notes that the current value of catches by tuna
vessels based in the Pacific island countries
is estimated at about US$300 million a year.
It is not clear whether this is the value of the
unprocessed fish or the value after
processing. If, however, this figure refers to
the value of the landed fish, then at an access
fee of 4 per cent of the value of the catch, the
access fee forgone would be US$12 million.
This figure can be compared with the
estimated total value of access fees received
by Pacific island countries in recent years of
US$60–70 million out of a total catch revenue
of about US$2 billion.
The most desirable tuna fisheries policies
appear to encompass the following
• a multilateral approach is adopted for
the establishment of the economically
sustainable harvest limits and the quotas
for each Pacific island country, as well
as for surveillance and monitoring;
• individual Pacific island country
auctions or tenders are used for the
allocation of their quotas to ensure the
maximisation of their resource rents;
• access fees are put to their best use, as
determined through benefit–cost
analysis, rather than indirectly
subsidising inefficient fishing-related
activities; and,
• the efficiency of the fishing effort is
maximised by not discriminating in
favour of domestic fishers or locally
based DWFN fishers, and the resource
rents and the capacity to pay access fees
are thereby maximised.
The behaviour of the DWFNs and
the WCPFC negotiations
The argument most commonly advanced
against the idea of individual Pacific island
countries tendering or auctioning the rights
to fish in their waters is that the DWFNs will
refuse to deal with the country. This
completely misunderstands the idea of
competitive processes. In a bilateral
negotiation, the individual DWFN fisher can
decide that it will withdraw from the
negotiation and deal with another country.
In the competitive situation that we have in
the Pacific, however, where there are a large
number of potential fishers, an auctioning
system requires them to compete against each
other for access. If the Pacific island country
does not believe that the auction or tendering
process is sufficiently competitive, it can
withdraw from the process and readvertise.
With respect to the behaviour of DWFN
fishers and the sustainability of the fish stock,
Grafton et al. (2005) have made the important
point that individual, secure harvesting
rights can promote collective action on the
part of the owners of such rights to ensure
that management practices are consistent
with maintaining the long-term value of their
asset. As well as the incentive that they will
have for surveillance of illegal fishing, which
I mentioned previously, they will engage in
other collective action on research into
sustainable harvests and equipment
improvements that reduce by-catch. The
authors mention as an example the recent
formation of the Tuna Industry Fishing
Association.
This point leads me to ask why the
DWFNs are so opposed to ideas such as
tradable harvest quotas, and why the
positions of the Pacific island countries and
the DWFNs, particularly the north Asian
fishers, were so far apart in the negotiations
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nautical mile exclusive economic zone that
led to the establishment of the Western and
Central Pacific Fisheries Commission
(WCPFC)? Are the Japanese, for example, not
interested in secure fishing rights and
sustainable management of the tuna stock?
If they are not, this would appear to be
contrary to their behaviour with respect to
their involvement in the use of other
resources. My hypothesis is that as long as
the Pacific island countries are not prepared
to provide secure fishing rights, the optimal
behaviour for the DWFNs is ‘free riding’.
This argument raises another question:
why did the Pacific island countries not put
forward any positions in the WCPFC
negotiations along the lines of allocating
fishing rights through a market-based system
such as transferable quotas? More to the
point, why is this form of allocation of fishing
rights within the exclusive economic zone
never discussed by the Pacific island
countries? I raised previously the possibility
that the Pacific island countries’ resistance
to this concept is because it would remove
an area of discretionary behaviour so integral
to the patron–client politics of the Pacific
island countries. Moreover, widespread
knowledge within the Pacific that this is how
politics is undertaken undermines the ability
of Pacific governments to undertake collective
action; that is, they do not trust each other. In
contract theory terms, this can be seen as a
lack of credibility of commitment to
cooperation.
While such behaviour can be expected
from Pacific governments—as it is ingrained
in their politics—what is so frustrating is the
lack of effort on the part of the Forum Fisheries
Agency to attempt to educate the public in
these countries about the costs of the nth-
best policies being followed. Australia has
put a lot of money into supporting the Forum
Fisheries Agency over the years and it strikes
me that the policies being followed could
hardly be any worse—and could possibly
be even better without the FFA. According to
its web site, the FFA was set up to ‘provide
expert fisheries management and
development advice and services to member
countries’. There appears to be no evidence
of the FFA serving any of its goals.
Parris and Grafton (2005) rightly dismiss
as being largely ineffectual the agreements
leading to the conclusion of the Convention
for the Conservation and Management of
Highly Migratory Fish Stocks in the Western
and Central Pacific and the establishment of
the WCPFC. For this reason, it is important
that the Pacific island countries focus on
maximising the benefits that they receive
from the exploitation of the tuna stocks in
their exclusive economic zone. If they do move
towards first-best fishing policies and
especially towards providing secure rights
for DWFN fishers, this might have flow-on
effects in the form of agreement on better
management of tuna stocks in the high seas
outside their exclusive economic zone.
Conclusions
The persistence of the Pacific island countries
in following poor policies in the exploitation
of their tuna resources is very disappointing.
The poor policies, which defy the law of
comparative advantage and the Tinbergen
principle, are wasteful uses of the resource
rents and are ineffective in achieving any of
the countries’ stated objectives. Persistence
with these policies appears to be an outcome
of the patron–client politics that pervade
Pacific politics. Moreover, the positions taken
by the Pacific island countries appear to
generate unhelpful reactions by the DWFNs,
resulting in corruption and free riding.
It is especially disappointing that the
Forum Fisheries Agency has been so
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by the Pacific island countries. Australia’s
investment in the Forum Fisheries Agency
has yielded a very poor return with respect
to policy improvements.
What could change this predatory
behaviour of Pacific island governments,
which has such high costs in terms of forgone
improvements in the welfare of Pacific
peoples? It is only through the education of
the public about the benefits of following
transparent, market-based policies that such
behaviour can be changed. Ultimately, if the
public does not demand good governance,
nothing will change.
Notes
1 For example, Montgomery (1995) stated that,
at the current rate of logging, the forests of
Solomon Islands could be depleted in 12–14
years, and, at faster rates of logging—which
has happened—depletion could occur within
8–10 years. Other writers made similar
predictions. Predictions that current rates of
logging will lead to depletion of Solomon
Islands’ forests within 10 years are still
popular.
2 I use quotation marks around the term
because the bilateral and multilateral deals
that have been made do not reflect the true
economic rent.
3 If the quality of the local ‘investments’ by the
DWFN fishers is anything like the quality of
similar investments made by foreign logging
companies in Papua New Guinea in exchange
for cheap access to forests, it is unlikely that
they will be long-lived or viable. Under these
circumstances, the foreign investor has no
vested interest in ensuring that the project
will be viable.
4 The rules-of-origin requirements for
supplying canned tuna to the EU market are
that the fish must be caught by vessels on
which the owner, the captain and the
majority of the crew are EU or ACP nationals.
These arrangements effectively protect the
domestic fleet from competition and limit the
efficiency of the canning operations.
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